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While much attention has been focused on the financial woes of the US economy in the wake of 
the Great Recession, this chapter focuses on an important real sector imbalance: the failure of real 
wages to keep pace with productivity growth over the past three decades. This imbalance is 
shown to create a structural flaw in the aggregate demand generating process that threatens to 
undermine future macroeconomic performance. The chapter reflects on the policy responses 
necessary to remedy this situation, and the likelihood that the US will succeed in avoiding a 
future of secular stagnation. 
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In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and Great Recession, much attention has 
been focused on financial imbalances in the US economy and the need for financial 
sector reform. There is, without doubt, good reason for this. But it is important not to 
overlook the fact that, prior to 2007, the US was bedeviled by important real sector 
imbalances. These real imbalances, which were important contributory factors to the 
financial crisis and Great Recession, and which continue to threaten the macroeconomic 
performance of the US economy going forward, are the focus of this chapter. 
The central arguments are as follows. Balanced growth of aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply requires (as a first approximation) that real wage growth keeps pace 
with productivity growth. But this has not happened in the US since the early 1970s. The 
result is a structural flaw in the aggregate demand generating process in the US economy, 
creating a latent aggregate demand deficiency. The aggregate demand deficiency was 
latent for several decades following its initial emergence because of the existence of 
numerous temporary and unsustainable “offsets” (Palley, 2002) – most notably, 
household debt accumulation. Since 2007, however, the aggregate demand deficiency has 
become dramatically manifest, thanks in large part to the exhaustion of the household 
debt accumulation “engine” of US consumption growth. These developments now 
threaten a future of secular stagnation which, in turn, constitutes a formidable policy 
challenge for the US economy. 
  The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
importance of the relationship between real wage and productivity growth for balanced 
growth in the goods market using growth accounting and simple Keynesian consumption 2 
 
theory. Section 3 discusses recent (post 1970s) US experience in light of this exercise, 
while section 4 outlines the prognosis for the US economy. Section 5 offers some 
conclusions that focus on the policy challenges currently confronting the US economy. 
 
2. Some Keynesian Growth Accounting 
The core argument on which this chapter is based is straightforward to 
demonstrate using some simple Keynesian macroeconomic theory and growth accounting 
techniques. Using Y to denote aggregate output, AD to denote aggregate demand, and C 
and A to represent aggregate consumption and all other sources of expenditure, 
respectively (with all variables in real terms), we begin by noting that goods market 
equilibrium requires: 
      Y AD =               [1] 
where: 
      AD C A = +              [2] 
Meanwhile, we can write: 






≡               [3] 
where Yp denotes potential output and L the labour force. By substituting [2] into [1] and 
converting both the result of this substitution and equation [3] into growth rates, we 
arrive at: 
      ˆˆ (1 ) cc yC A ωω = +−             [4] 
and: 
      p y qn = +              [5] 3 
 
where y and yp are the rates of growth of actual and potential output (respectively), q is 
the rate of growth of labour productivity, n is the rate of growth of the labour force, and 
c ω  is the share of consumption spending in aggregate demand.  
Now note that in order to get steady growth consistent with a constant rate of 
employment, we must observe y = yp. This follows from the fact that, by definition, the 
rate of employment (e) can be stated as: 








If N/Y = L/Yp – that is, if the labour to output ratio is invariant with respect to the scale of 
production at any point in time (as, for example, when production is characterized by a 
Leontieff technology) – it follows from the statement above that: 
      ˆ p eyy = −  
It is now obvious that we must observe y = yp in order to get  ˆ 0 e = and hence a constant 
rate of employment in the steady state. In fact, this result is imperative since, if  p yy ≠  so 
that  ˆ 0 ec = ≠, a secular trend in the employment rate will result. But since e is bounded 
above and below (by 0 and 1, respectively), this is impossible to sustain. In other words, 
we must observe y = yp in order for steady state growth to be sustainable. It follows from 
this analysis, together with equations [4] and [5] above, that a necessary condition for 
sustainable steady state growth is: 
      ˆˆ (1 ) cc C Aqn ωω +− =+          [6] 
Now suppose that: 
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      w C c wN c D π = + Π+  
where Π denotes total profits, cw and cπ are the propensities to consume of worker and 
capitalist/rentier households (respectively), and D is net new borrowing by worker 
households (defined as the difference between workers’ total consumption and the 
consumption that can be funded by current wage income, given the propensity to 
consume cw). Assuming that 01 w cc π =<< : 
      w C c wN D = +  
It may appear that the consumption function above neglects the fact that borrowing 
causes the accumulation of debt on which interest payments must be made by debtors. 
But in fact this is not the case. Hence note that cw < 1 allows for part of total wage 
income (specifically, [1 – cw]wN) to either be saved or transferred to capitalist/rentier 
households to service the outstanding debts of working households, ΣD. Moreover, if we 
assume that (1 ) w c wN r D − >Σ (where r is the real interest rate) and that debt servicing is 
considered a substitute for saving by working households, then the consumption function 
above will successfully describe aggregate consumption spending (with cw constant) 
despite the fact that D > 0 implies increasing household indebtedness and hence, for a 
constant rate of interest, increasing debt servicing out of wage income by working 
households. This is because, under the conditions posited above, we will observe: 
      (1 ) (1 ) ww S c wN r D r D c wN = − − Σ +Π+ Σ = − +Π  
where S denotes aggregate saving and rD Σ  captures transfer payments out of working- 
households’ savings to capitalist/rentier households to service currently outstanding 5 
 
debts. As can be seen from this expression, debt servicing has no effect on aggregate 
saving (and hence aggregate consumption).
1 
Now note that the consumption function derived above can be re-written as: 
      w
N
C cw L D
L
= +  
from which it follows (assuming that the employment rate, N/L, remains constant) that: 
      ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) YY C wn D ωω = ++−          [7] 
Substituting [7] into [6] and re-arranging, we arrive at: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ [ (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 ) c Y Y c cY w D Aq n ω ω ω ω ωω +− +− =+−     [8] 
Now assume that: 
      ˆ ˆ Dwn = +  
or in other words, that the deficit to income ratio of working households remains 
constant. Substituting this last expression into [8] yields: 
      ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) cc c w Aq n ωω ω +− =+−         [9] 
Finally, as  1 c ω → ,
2 the expression in [9] reduces to: 
        ˆ wq =               [9a] 
What equation [9a] establishes is that as a first approximation, sustainable long run 
growth consistent with a constant rate of unemployment requires the equality of real 
wage growth and productivity growth. 
                                                 
1 Obviously this argument cannot be sustained indefinitely if total indebtedness and hence debt servicing 
commitments grow to the extent that debt servicing exceeds working households’ saving at the constant 
propensity to consume, cw. In this case, the propensity to consume out of wages must fall, or else working 
households will default on their current debt servicing commitments. In either case, current consumption 
will then be affected by debt servicing commitments resulting from prior borrowing activity. Essentially, 
then, we are abstracting from these possibilities in the analysis above. 
2 Historically,  0.66 c ω ≈  in the US economy.  Currently,  0.70 c ω ≈ . 6 
 
3. Recent US Experience 
Based on the analysis in the preceding section, it immediately becomes obvious 
that a key problem with US growth since the 1970s has been that real wage growth has 
consistently fallen short of productivity growth. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which 
shows that since the early 1970s, production and non-supervisory workers have 
experienced real wage growth that has been systematically slower than productivity 
growth, whether we look at real wages narrowly defined or total compensation (which 
includes fringe benefits such as employer contributions to health insurance premia and 
pension plans).
3 To the extent that the experience of production and non-supervisory 
workers is representative of that of all workers, then, Figure 1 implies (in light of the 
analysis in section 2) a structural flaw in the US aggregate demand generating process, as 
a result of which aggregate demand growth will struggle to keep pace with potential 
output growth. 
        FIGURE 1 GOES HERE 
In fact, the experience of all employees (including supervisory workers) has been 
similar to that of production workers – as evidenced by the decline in the US wage share 
since late 1970s – but only somewhat so (Atkinson, 2009; Glyn, 2009). This is because of 
the burgeoning wage inequality that has accompanied the redistribution of income from 
wages to profits over the past thirty years (Palley, 2002; Piketty and Saez, 2003; Wolff 
and Zacharias, 2009; Atkinson et al, 2011).
4 But ultimately none of this detracts from the 
                                                 
3 See also Fleck et al (2011). 
4 Piketty and Saez (2003), Wolff and Zacharias (2009) and Atkinson et al (2001) all focus on the evolution 
of “top incomes” in the US, showing that even as top capital incomes have increased over the last thirty 
years, so the “working rich” have, in increasing numbers, joined capitalist/rentier households at the top of 
the income distribution. See also Mohun (2006) on the correct accounting treatment of the “wage” income 
earned by the “working rich”. 7 
 
story told by Figure 1 and its consequences for the US economy, especially if the 
characteristics of supervisory worker households more closely resemble those of 
capitalist/rentier households than production worker households. Hence given: 
(1 ) ps wN w N w N ϕϕ = +−           [10] 
where φ denotes the proportion of production workers among total employees, and if we 
can write as a first approximation: 
    ( [1 ] ) wp s C cw N c w N D π ϕϕ = + − +Π +  
then assuming 01 w cc π =<<  (as in section 2) now yields: 
    wp
N
C cw L D
L
ϕ = +  
    ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) Yp Y Cw n D ωϕ ω ⇒= ++ +−           [7a] 
The expression in [7a] is qualitatively similar to that in [7], except that consumption 
growth – and hence the capacity of aggregate demand growth to keep pace with potential 
output growth in equation [8] – is now shown to depend on growth in the real wages of 
production workers, precisely the group that is the focus of Figure 1. Note also that, 
according to [7a]: 
 
a)  ˆ 0 ϕ <  – i.e., growth in the proportion of employees who are supervisory 
workers (on which see, for example, Gordon, 1996) – will antagonize the 
problems of aggregate demand formation by reducing consumption growth 
(ceteris paribus); 
b)  ˆˆ ps ww <  (which, ceteris paribus, implies from equation [10] a rising share of 
wage income accruing to supervisory workers and hence the increased wage 8 
 
inequality observed by Palley and others) and, as a consequence, 
ˆˆˆ ˆ pp w w w nwn < ⇒ +<+, will further antagonize the problems associated with 
the aggregate demand generating process, by making the growth of consumption 
spending in [7a] slower than its equivalent in [7] (ceteris paribus).
5 
 
The substance of Figure 1, in terms of the analysis in section 2, is, therefore, that since 
the 1970s, there has existed a structural flaw in the US aggregate demand generating 
process. As a result of this flaw, which suggests that ceteris paribus, aggregate demand 
growth cannot keep pace with the growth of potential output, the US economy should 
have experienced slow growth (relative to potential) and rising unemployment over the 
past thirty years. But of course it didn’t. On the contrary, since the early 1990s (and prior 
to the onset of the Great Recession), US macroeconomic performance has been quite 
respectable by both historical and contemporary comparative standards, with 
unemployment falling to rates last seen in the early 1970s by the start of the current 
millennium. The question we confront, then, is the following: what offset the latent 
aggregate demand deficiency caused by deficient real wage growth in the US economy? 
Or more specifically, bearing in mind that the importance of consumption as a fraction of 
                                                 
5 Note that production workers’ share of the total wage bill can be written as: 






σ = =  
        ˆˆˆ pp ww σ ⇒=−  
where φ is taken as given. Meanwhile, it follows from equation [10] that: 
        ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) pp p s ww w σσ = +−  
        ˆ ˆˆ (1 )( ) p pps ww σσ ⇒= − −  
It is clear from this last expression that  ˆˆ ˆ0 ps p ww σ −⇒< , from which it follows (referring back to the 
original expression for  ˆ p σ  derived above) that  ˆˆ p ww <  and hence  ˆˆ p w nwn +<+. 9 
 
GDP has actually risen in the US over the past thirty years, what shored up household 
spending?
6 
  One possible answer is the “overworked American” phenomenon: the increased 
commitment of time to the paid labour market by US working households. But although 
this phenomenon is real (see, for example, Schor, 1991; Bluestone and Rose, 1997), it is 
incapable in principle of plugging the gap between aggregate demand and potential 
output created by slow real wage growth. This claim follows directly from the analysis in 
section 2. Hence note that an increase in hours worked contributes in the first instance to 
n (the rate of growth of the labour force). With  1 c ω < , a rise in n makes a net 
contribution to the growth of potential output, exacerbating the demand-deficiency 
problem (see equation [9]), while in the limit (with  1 c ω = ), n has no impact whatsoever 
on the capacity of aggregate demand to keep pace with the growth of potential output 
(see equation [9a]). In other words, steadily increasing the hours worked by American 
families cannot, in principle, have helped offset the aggregate demand generating 
problem created by real wage growth lagging productivity growth. In fact, rather than 
offsetting the imbalance between real wage and productivity growth, the overworked 
American phenomenon merely added to the real sector imbalances that characterized 
growth prior to the Great Recession, by distorting the allocation of working households’ 
time as between the paid labour market and other (social and family) activities. 
                                                 
6 This last observation – that more than ever, the US economy is consumption-led – is important, because it 
is quite possible for the dynamics of a Keynesian economy to be profit-led (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). In 
this case, the fall in the wage share of income that results from productivity growth outpacing real wage 
growth will stimulate the growth of investment spending even as the growth of consumption spending 
atrophies, and to such an extent that economy-wide growth increases. But it is difficult to reconcile this 
sequence of events, which suggests investment spending displacing consumption spending in the 
composition of aggregate demand, with the fact that the investment share of GDP has remained essentially 
static over the past thirty years (Baker, forthcoming) while the consumption share has increased markedly. 10 
 
What did, of course, shore up household consumption spending despite the stagnancy 
of real wages was unprecedented household debt accumulation (Cynamon and Fazzari, 
2008, forthcoming(a); Barba and Pivetti, 2009).
7 Referring once again to the analysis in 
section 2, US households resorted to a mechanism whereby  ˆ ˆ Dwn >+  and a consequent 
rise in 1 Y ω −  (the proportion of consumption expenditures financed by debt 
accumulation) offset the deficiency of real wage growth relative to productivity growth 
so as to allow aggregate demand growth to keep pace with the expansion of potential 
output (see equation [8]). 
The problem with this “solution” is that, as noted in section 2, it is impossible to 
escape the fact that accumulated debt needs to be serviced. As households accumulate 
debt to finance consumption they cannot fund from income, this increases their debt 
servicing obligations, which will ultimately put further strain on their income and its 
ability to fund consumption, requiring more aggressive debt accumulation to maintain the 
growth of consumption spending, and so on.
8 This behaviour is all very far removed from 
households accumulating debt in order to smooth consumption according to an optimal 
intertemporal plan (as envisaged by the lifecycle consumption hypothesis). But it is all 
                                                 
7 An increase in conspicuous consumption by very high income households may have complemented this 
development. It certainly seems to be the case that while household debt accumulation facilitated the 
expansion of consumption spending above and beyond what could be funded by income growth, what 
motivated this debt-financed spending were consumption norms that included “emulation effects” based on 
imitation of the conspicuous consumption of very high income households. See, for example, Cynamon and 
Fazzari (2008, forthcoming(a) and Dutt (2010). 
8 As noted in section 2, as debt servicing increases in response to rising indebtedness, it can eventually 
squeeze consumption by exceeding what workers save out of their wage income, thereby forcing a 
reduction in the propensity to consume out of wages (and hence aggregate consumption spending) if 
working households are to avoid default. In the language of Pollin (1997), we have a situation where the 
growth of consumption in equation [8] depends not just on the “ordinary workings of the labour market” 
(generating growth in wage income), but also on the “ordinary workings of financial markets” (creating 
continual growth in household borrowing) – a situation which dramatically increases the financial fragility 
of the economy’s growth regime relative to the situation in which consumption growth is fully funded by 
real wage growth. 11 
 
quite possible in a world of deficient information and fundamental uncertainty, where 
consumption and debt accumulation are guided by norms and “animal spirits”. The result 
is a stock-flow imbalance in the aggregate demand generating process, emanating from 
household finances. Either the growth of aggregate demand will suffer exhaustion as 
households eventually retrench by reducing their borrowing (or even more radically, 
reducing their indebtedness), or the aggregate demand generating process implodes, as 
defaults due to the rising burden of debt servicing trigger a credit crunch (a sudden 
reluctance of financial markets to meet the borrowing demands of households) that 
adversely affects aggregate demand formation, resulting in reduced growth of output and 
hence employment and hence wage income, which further antagonizes the problem of 
aggregate demand formation both directly (by reducing the growth of consumption 
funded by wage income) and indirectly (by increasing the distress of indebted households 
and their inability to meet current debt servicing obligations), and so on in a deflationary 
vicious cycle. The claim here is that this latter scenario is essentially what happened in 
the US beginning in 2007, triggered by an initial wave of defaults emanating from the 
sub-prime mortgage market.  
In sum, over the last 3 decades, the chief characteristic of US macroeconomic 
performance has not been the much-vaunted “great moderation” (on which see Davis and 
Kahn, 2008; Galí and Gambetti, 2009), but instead an increasing latent financial fragility. 
This was brought about by debt accumulation by lower and middle income households 
seeking to offset their weak real income growth (and, in the process, remedy a structural 
flaw in the aggregate demand generating process). Eventually, time ran out on this 12 
 
growth regime: in 2007, the latent financial fragility referred to above became manifest, 
resulting in the subsequent financial crisis and Great Recession, and their aftermaths. 
 
4. What next? 
Although the Great Recession officially ended in June 2009,
9 it is abundantly 
clear that there has, as yet, been no effective recovery of the US economy. Perhaps the 
most vivid illustration of this claim is the behaviour of the employment to population 
ratio.
10 Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that in the six months following the official 
end of the Great Recession, the employment to population ratio actually fell (from 59.4% 
to 58.2%), since when it has remained remarkably stable during two full calendar years of 
alleged economic recovery, fluctuating (mildly) around an average rate of approximately 
58.5%.
11 
What do these statistics signify going forward? One possibility is that they 
represent nothing more than a slow recovery from a deep downturn. On this view, the 
“offsets” that masked the latent aggregate demand deficiency identified in section 3 are 
still capable of functioning. The credit crunch and reluctance of households’ to borrow 
that have characterized the period since the onset of the Great Recession are no more than 
temporary, and once debt-financed consumption spending resumes, the economy will 
recover. Note, however, that based on the analysis in section 3, such an outcome would 
represent nothing more than a “winding up of the clock springs” of the same 
                                                 
9 This is the date determined by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research as marking the end of the Great Recession. 
10 The employment to population ratio has become a more reliable indicator of underutilized labour 
resources in the US economy than the unemployment rate, owing to the marked cyclical sensitivity of the 
US labour force participation rate in recent decades. 
11 See http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS12300000. Prior to the onset of the Great recession in 2007, the US 
employment to population ratio peaked at 63.4%. 13 
 
unsustainable growth process that preceded the Great Recession. In the short-medium 
term, economic growth may increase sufficiently to meaningfully lower unemployment 
(and raise the employment to population ratio). But the question then becomes: when will 
the next crisis occur as a result of this fundamentally unbalanced aggregate demand 
generating process breaking down, and how bad will it be? 
If the Great Recession instead heralds an enduring unwillingness to lend to 
households and/or an enduring unwillingness of households to borrow – i.e., if the pre-
2007 “offsets” that masked the structural flaw in the US economy’s aggregate demand 
generating process are truly exhausted – then ceteris paribus, the behaviour of the 
employment to population ratio noted above would seem to mark the onset of a period of 
secular stagnation. Of course, other things may not be equal – other “offsets” may come 
to the rescue. But a priori this is difficult to imagine. For example, the prospects of an 
export boom seem almost non-existent in an economy that has suffered chronic balance 
of trade deficits for over three decades (and on which aggressively export-led economies 
– most notably Germany, Japan, and China – have come to rely as a source of external 
markets). A sudden resurgence of investment spending appears equally unlikely. 
According to authors such as Cornwall (1971), the investment-led US business cycles of 
the 1950s and’60s involved initial recoveries in housing starts (as a result of the housing 
cycle being slightly out of phase with the business cycle), following which other forms of 
investment increased as a result of accelerator and “crowding in” effects.
12 But given the 
                                                 
12 “Crowding in” results from improved short term outcomes increasing confidence in the business sector, 
thus increasing the proclivity of firms to invest on the basis of any given profit expectations in an 
environment of fundamental uncertainty. See also Leamer (2007) for a recent rediscovery of the interplay 
between the housing cycle and business cycle in the US economy. 14 
 
continued distressed state of the US housing market, the notion of a strong recovery led, 
in the first instance, by housing starts seems fanciful in the extreme.
13 
A final source of offsets that may yet prevent a future of secular stagnation is the 
public sector. The US central government is certainly better placed than the US 
household sector to engage in deficit spending.
14 To put the matter bluntly: current 
concern with a US national debt to income ratio in the vicinity of 100% appears absurd 
when it is recalled that at the start of the last boom – just as US households were about to 
engage in another surge in borrowing that would propel economic growth by further 
increasing their debt to income ratios – the two-thirds of US households with income 
below $50,000 already had debt to income ratios of approximately 300% (Palley, 2002). 
The absurdity is only increased by the observation that the debt-servicing capabilities of 
households and central governments do not even bear comparison. An individual low-
middle income US household must meet its debt servicing obligations from the income 
generated by relatively few, potentially insecure, jobs. The US central government, 
meanwhile, can draw on a highly diversified income stream – all tax revenues – and has 
the capacity to monetize its expenditures (i.e., obtain the means of exchange by creating 
money). Nevertheless, US government deficits and debts have created enormous political 
theatre since the initial fiscal response to the onset of the Great Recession. Moreover, the 
debacle of the Eurozone has only increased political opposition to public sector debt 
accumulation – despite the fact that there is simply no useful comparison to be made 
between the US economy on one hand and, on the other, peripheral, southern European 
                                                 
13 It is unsettling to note that according to Cornwall (1971), a housing cycle that was in phase with the 
business cycle – with the result that housing starts were not a leading force in recovery – was characteristic 
of the US economy in the 1920s and’30s. 
14 See Cynamon and Fazzari (forthcoming(b)) for more extensive discussion of this theme. 15 
 
economies that, by virtue of the institutional design of the monetary union to which they 
belong, have no access to a government banker (see, for example, Palley, 2011). In short, 
in the current political climate in the US, we can only conclude that the political 
willingness necessary to use the state as an engine of aggregate demand generation 
simply does not exist. 
 
5. Conclusions: what is to be done? 
  It is clear from the prognoses above that confronting the legacy of the Great 
Recession poses major policy challenges for the US economy. Addressing the core real 
sector imbalance that has afflicted the aggregate demand generating process for the past 
thirty years requires, in the first instance, that we understand how this imbalance arose. 
According to authors such as Cornwall (1990) and Bowles et al (1990), the answer is to 
be found in the breakdown, during the early 1970s, of post-war labour market institutions 
that codified and enforced a “value sharing” norm of distributive justice, as a result of 
which real wage growth kept pace with productivity growth and the labour share of 
income remained buoyant. It follows that reconstruction of this value sharing norm of 
distributive justice would, in principle, re-balance the US aggregate demand generating 
process. But this is easier said than done. Changes in domestic labour law that, for 
example, make it easier for workers to collectively organize and hence bargain for the 
wage increases necessary to keep pace with productivity growth might (in principle) be 
easy to effect.
15 But phenomena such as global outsourcing and deindustrialization have 
fundamentally changed and complicated the US industrial relations landscape since the 
                                                 
15 See Block et al (1996) on the role of changes in labour law in contributing to the unraveling of the 
original post-war value sharing norm of distributive justice. 16 
 
1970s.
16  Although it would be fatalistic to suggest that these new challenges cannot be 
surmounted (much less that they should not be addressed), the fact remains that 
addressing the real imbalance that afflicts the US economy at its source constitutes an 
enormous task. 
  An alternative would be for policy makers to address the problem indirectly, by 
seeking a post-tax fix through redistributive fiscal policy. This would involve increasing 
taxes on profit income and the “working rich” – in other words, on the “top incomes” 
analyzed by Atkinson et al (2011) and others – in order to make transfer payments 
towards low and middle income households. Whether these take the form of cash 
payments or payments in kind (through greater provision of public goods), their purpose 
would be to support the consumption aspirations of low and middle income households 
without the latter having to resort to another bout of unsustainable debt accumulation. But 
once again, the difficulties of executing this policy agenda cannot be underestimated. 
Explicitly redistributive fiscal policies of the sort contemplated here appear no more 
popular in the current US political climate than deficit-financed increases in public 
spending. 
  Even if the US is able to fix (or eventually grow out of) its financial imbalances 
and reform its financial sector to avoid repeating the lending excesses of the last boom, 
the real sector imbalance identified in this paper – real wages growing slower than 
productivity, which constitutes a structural flaw in the aggregate demand generating 
process – will continue to bedevil the US economy. As demonstrated in section 4, the 
                                                 
16 The decline of unionization rates in the US is linked, in part, to the shift of employment away from 
manufacturing, the sector in which trade union organization has traditionally been strongest. See, for 
example, Bronfenbrenner (2000) and Davies and Vadlamannati (2011) on the adverse impact of 
globalization on US labour market institutions. 17 
 
prognosis is poor if this real imbalance is not addressed. And as demonstrated above, the 
policy challenges involved in addressing the imbalance (both economic and political) are 
formidable. Although it is impossible to rule out the emergence of another aggregate 
demand “offset” that, at least temporarily, improves growth sufficiently to significantly 
lower unemployment, it is otherwise difficult to avoid the conclusion that the prospects 
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